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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-SIXTH AMENDMENT-RIGHT TO COUNSEL
-CONFIDENTIALITY OF ATTORNEY-CLIENT CONSULTATION-The
United States Supreme Court has held that the mere presence of an
undercover agent at a pretrial conference between a criminal defen-
dant and his attorney does not violate the defendant's sixth amend-
ment right to counsel or his fourteenth amendment right to a fair
trial, and hence cannot be the basis of a section 1983 claim, absent
proof that the agent revealed the substance of the consultation to
the government.
Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U.S. 545 (1977).
On March 19, 1970, Brett Allen Bursey, Jack M. Weatherford,
and two other men vandalized the offices of the Richland County
Selective Service Board.' Execution of the plan went smoothly but,
unknown to Bursey, Weatherford was an undercover agent' for the
South Carolina State Law Enforcement Division (SLED), and he
reported the incident. The next day, Bursey and Weatherford were
arrested and taken to the Richland County Sheriff's Office, where
they were charged with malicious destruction of property and crimi-
nal conspiracy.
On two occasions prior to trial, Weatherford was invited to Bur-
sey's conferences with his attorney. Bursey questioned Weatherford
to obtain ideas for Bursey's defense, and Weatherford was asked if
he intended to testify for the prosecution.' Weatherford assured
Bursey that he would not testify and that he would, if necessary,
invoke his fifth amendment privilege. Relying upon Weatherford's
promise, Bursey was completely surprised when the first witness for
the state was Weatherford.
Following his conviction,4 Bursey filed a suit under the Civil
1. Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U.S. 545, 547 (1977). According to Bursey, both he and
Weatherford painted peace symbols on the wall and threw bricks at windows. Brief for
Respondent at 8, Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U.S. 545 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Brief for
Respondent].
2. The Supreme Court noted the "unfortunate necessity" for undercover work and its
value to effective law enforcement. 429 U.S. at 557. See, e.g., United States v. Russell, 411
U.S. 423, 432 (1973) (a recognized and permissible means of investigation); Lewis v. United
States, 385 U.S. 206, 208-09 (1966) (undercover agents are necessary but their actions are
checked by the Bill of Rights).
3. Brief for Respondent, supra note 1, at 16-17.
4. Bursey neither appealed his conviction nor sought post-conviction relief under either
state statute or federal habeas corpus proceedings. Bursey v. Weatherford, 528 F.2d 483, 485
n.1 (4th Cir. 1975), rev'd, 429 U.S. 545 (1977).
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Rights Act of 18711 seeking damages from both Weatherford and his
supervisor, Pete Strom, Chief of SLED.' Specifically, Bursey al-
leged interference with his sixth amendment7 right to counsel and
5. The statute originally enacted by Congress as the Civil Rights Act of 1871, ch. 22, § 1,
17 Stat. 13, provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute . ..of any State or Territory, subjects,
or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the
jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured
by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law,
suit in equity or other proper proceeding for redress.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970) [hereinafter referred to as section 1983]. Reportedly, agents from
the Federal Bureau of Investigation worked along with state agents in investigating the
incident at the Selective Service building. McDonald, A Profile of Two Friends, CIvIL
LIBERTIES, November 1974, at 4, col. 1. Bursey could not, however, join the federal agents as
defendants in his law suit since employees of the federal government cannot be sued under §
1983. Cases recognizing this limitation include: Roots v. Callahan, 475 F.2d 751 (5th Cir.
1973) (suit will not lie under this subchapter against federal officials acting under color of
federal law); Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 456 F.2d
1339 (2d Cir. 1972) (section 1983 does not apply to federal officers); Savage v. United States,
450 F.2d 449 (8th Cir. 1971) (section 1983 does not provide a basis for suit against federal
officials), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1043 (1972).
Bursey was additionally precluded from suing the trial judge or the prosecuting attorney
because both judges and attorneys are immune from § 1983 suits for actions taken within their
official capacities. See, e.g., Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 554 (1967) (judge is immune "even
when the judge is accused of acting maliciously and corruptly"); Phillips v. Nash, 311 F.2d
513 (7th Cir. 1962) (if the prosecutor acts within the discretionary role of his official duties,
he is immune from § 1983 suits), cert. denied, 374 U.S. 809 (1963).
6. Before a supervisor of an offending government employee can be sued under § 1983,
the court must find that the supervisor was personally involved in the wrongful conduct,
rather than responsible in a general, supervisory capacity. See, e.g., Bracey v. Grenoble, 494
F.2d 566 (3d Cir. 1974) (superior officer not responsible for prisoner's beating, absent evidence
that superior saw beating or knew of past beatings); Jennings v. Davis, 476 F.2d 1271 (8th
Cir. 1973) (Chief of Police and Board of Police Commissioners not liable under respondeat
superior where they did not have the "duty, opportunity, or ability" to prevent alleged
unreasonable search and seizure). For a rare case to the contrary, see Whirl v. Kern, 407 F.2d
781 (5th Cir.) (personal knowledge of unlawful detention not required to hold warden liable
under § 1983 for failing to release prisoner when his sentence had ended), cert. denied, 396
U.S. 901 (1969).
7. The text of the sixth amendment to the United States Constitution reads:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public
trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been
committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses
against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to
have the Assistance of Counsel for his defense.
U.S. CONST. amend. VI. The right to counsel arises at any critical stage of the criminal
proceedings. White v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 59 (1963) (per curiam) (appointment of "all mem-
bers of the bar" as counsel for arraignment not effective appointment). It has also been
decided that the right to counsel extends to the decision of how to plead. United States ex
rel. Hart v. Davenport, 478 F.2d 203 (3d Cir. 1973) (counsel ineffective because single attorney
represented several co-defendants).
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his fourteenth amendment due process right to a fair trial. The
United States District Court for the District of South Carolina,
finding no gross intrusion upon the attorney-client relationship,
held that neither Weatherford nor Strom had violated any of Bur-
sey's constitutional rights.8
The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed9 and re-
manded. 0 Disagreeing with the test used by the trial judge in which
the extent of the intrusion was determinative, the court of appeals
instead focused on the nature of the intrusion. If the intrusion was
deliberate," the right to counsel was sufficiently affected so as to
8. The district court premised its decision upon three findings. First, since Weatherford
had not intentionally sought information concerning Bursey's trial strategy, there had not
been a "gross" intrusion into the confidential relationship between attorney and client and,
therefore, there was no interference with Bursey's right to counsel. Second, Bursey did not
show that he was prejudiced by Weatherford's attending the attorney-client conferences.
Third, Weatherford and his attorney sought and succeeded in obtaining a severance of the
two defendant's trials, considered to be quite unusual by the district court; therefore, Bursey
should have suspected that Weatherford might be a government agent. Bursey v. Weather-
ford, 528 F.2d at 486.
9. Id. at 485. The court of appeals' decision was approved in a recent case note: 54 N.C.L.
Rav. 1276 (1976).
10. The court of appeals found both Weatherford and Strom personally liable. Weather-
ford was liable for his intrusion, whereas, Strom's liability arose from his participation in the
decision to maintain Weatherford's cover, entrusting the details of protecting the cover to the
prosecution, and personally concurring in the decision to allow Weatherford to testify. Never-
theless, the court of appeals remanded for a finding on a potential good faith defense. 528
F.2d at 488-89.
11. Id. at 486. The court of appeals was using the term "deliberate" to refer only to the
decision to pursue a particular course of action, not the intent to purposely injure another.
Intent to injure has been held to be unnecessary for a cause of action under § 1983. See, e.g.,
Roberts v. Williams, 456 F.2d 819 (5th Cir.) (improper motive not a prerequisite), cert.
denied, 404 U.S. 866 (1971); Allison v. Wilson, 434 F.2d 646 (9th Cir. 1970) (specific intent
to violate constitutional rights not a necessary element of a § 1983 cause of action), cert.
denied, 404 U.S. 863 (1971); Jenkins v. Averett, 424 F.2d 1228 (4th Cir. 1970) (intent to injure
not required).
The court of appeals in Weatherford concluded it was not necessary that prejudice to the
defendant be shown to have resulted from an intrusion by an agent when the action was
deliberate, though it might be relevant to the issue of damages. 528 F.2d at 486-87. Presuma-
bly, an inadvertent violation of an individual's constitutional right to counsel would not raise
a cause of action under § 1983. Additionally, the court considered "of no consequence" the
possibility that the intrusion might not have been undertaken purposefully to obtain informa-
tion, but simply to protect Weatherford's cover. The prosecution's knowing arrangement of
or acquiescence in an intrusion into the attorney-client relationship sufficiently endangered
the right to counsel so as to require a reversal and a new trial. 528 F.2d at 486.
The tack chosen by the court of appeals, focusing as it did upon the nature rather than
the extent of the intrusion into the attorney-client relationship, has support in case law.
Where an intrusion is proven to be purely inadvertent, the right to counsel is not denied. See,
e.g., United States v. Bullock, 441 F.2d 59 (5th Cir. 1971) (right to counsel not violated when
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require a new trial. To support this per se rule, the court cited the
Supreme Court's decisions of Black v. United States2 and O'Brien
v. United States,'" cases in which the convictions were summarily
vacated because conversations between the defendants and their
attorneys were monitored during the pretrial period.'4 The court
further held that Bursey's right to a fair trial was violated by Weath-
erford's deception.' 5 Relying on Brady v. Maryland,' which held
officers eavesdropped on a telephone conversation of defendant with attorney since officers
testified positively that they had no knowledge that the conversation was with counsel).
12. 385 U.S. 26 (1966) (per curiam). In Black, the defendant's conversations with his
attorney had been monitored and taped for two months prior to and one month after evidence
had been presented to the grand jury. The defendant was ultimately convicted for tax eva-
sion. Subsequently, the Solicitor General revealed that conversations and exchanges between
the defendant and his attorney were intercepted by agents of the Federal Bureau of Investiga-
tion, who were investigating a matter unrelated to the tax evasion case. The defendant
appealed and the Supreme Court granted certiorari. Though the Solicitor General claimed
that the prosecuting attorneys for the tax evasion case had never seen the reports and memo-
randa of the tapes, the Supreme Court felt that justice required a new trial so that the
defendant could prepare a defense against "the use of evidence that might otherwise be
inadmissible." Id. at 29.
13. 386 U.S. 345 (1967) (per curiam). In this case, defendant O'Brien and another were
convicted on several counts of removing merchandise from a bonded area under the supervi-
sion of the United States Customs Service, a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 549 (1970). The defen-
dant appealed, alleging trial errors and insufficient evidence. Apart from these issues raised
by the defendant, the Solicitor General informed the Court that he had learned that the
defendant's business premises had been bugged by the Federal Bureau of Investigation. The
Solicitor General stated that the contents of the overheard conversation between the defen-
dant and his attorney were not reported to the Department of Justice and the attorneys
prosecuting this case. Regardless, the Supreme Court reversed without opinion, ordering a
new trial.
In a dissenting opinion, Justices Harlan and Stewart thought the facts indicated an exam-
ple of a "totally insignificant and uncommunicated eavesdropping." They saw Black as being
distinguishable, for in Black, part of a recorded conversation had been incorporated into a
memorandum used by the prosecuting attorneys. The prosecutor in the O'Brien case, how-
ever, knew nothing of the bugging. 386 U.S. at 347.
14. The court of appeals read Black and O'Brien together as establishing a per se rule of
automatic reversal for deliberate governmental intrusions into privileged attorney-client con-
ferences. 528 F.2d at 486.
15. The court of appeals explained that failure to disclose the existence of an informant
during the defendant's trial preparation lulls an accused into a false sense of security prior
to trial. Thus, Bursey's attorney was unable to evaluate the necessity of plea bargaining. Also,
defense counsel was denied the opportunity to prepare for cross-examination of Weatherford
by doing a background check on him. For this reason, defense counsel could not plan for the
"devastating impact of eyewitness identification." Id. at 487.
16. 373 U.S. 83 (1963). In Brady, defendant Brady and his companion, Boblit, were
charged with murder in the first degree. Brady maintained that Boblit committed the mur-
der. To prepare his case, Brady's attorney asked the prosecution prior to trial for leave to
examine Boblit's extrajudicial statements. A few of those statements were shown to Brady's
counsel but not the one in which Boblit admitted his guilt. Brady's attorney did not learn of
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that due process requires the disclosure, upon request, of evidence
favorable to an accused, the court of appeals held the failure to
reveal Weatherford's identity to be violative of this right.
On appeal, the United States Supreme Court reversed. 7 In an
opinion written by Justice White, the Court held that the sixth
amendment does not establish a per se rule forbidding an under-
cover agent from meeting with an accused's counsel. The majority
noted the district court's finding, undisturbed by the court of ap-
peals, that Weatherford did not communicate the substance of the
attorney-client conference to his supervisor." Since the informer did
not relay this information to other law enforcement officials or the
prosecutor," the Court held that he posed no substantial threat to
the defendant's sixth amendment rights. A per se rule was seen as
too broad, needlessly interfering with police undercover work, a nec-
essary and effective tool of law enforcement."
The Court disagreed with the court of appeals' interpretation of
Black and O'Brien." Though both cases admittedly involved over-
heard conversations between counsel and client, the Court ques-
tioned whether these cases were delineating definitive sixth amend-
ment rights. The Black and O'Brien opinions did not identify which
amendment had been violated, but, the Weatherford Court noted,
they were cases of clear fourth amendment violations by illegal
search and seizure. The Court favored a fourth amendment reading
of the two cases because the fourth amendment grounds for exclud-
ing the fruits of illegal surveillance were well established, whereas
Boblit's confession until Brady had been convicted and the conviction affirmed on appeal.
Thereupon, Brady appealed under the Maryland Post Conviction Procedure Act, but his
conviction was affirmed by the state courts. The Supreme Court granted certiorari and held
that the prosecution's suppression of evidence favorable to an accused, when requested,
denies him due process if the evidence is material to either guilt or punishment. Id. at 87.
17. Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U.S. 545 (1977).
18. The action against Strom was summarily dismissed in a footnote. Since the Court
concluded that Weatherford's activities did not violate Bursey's constitutional rights, Strom
could not be found liable for his involvement in Weatherford's undercover work. Id. at 561
n.6.
19. In United States v. Crow Dog, 532 F.2d 1182 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S.
929 (1977), the court of appeals similarly declined to reverse a conviction where it was not
shown that an informant passed incriminating evidence to the authorities. Specifically, the
court affirmed the conviction because the appellant failed to prove either that the government
operative was present during discussions of defense strategy relevant to that particular defen-
dant or that the operative passed such information to the FBI. Id. at 1197-98.
20. 429 U.S. at 557.
21. Id. at 550-52.
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the sixth amendment protection had not, in the Court's opinion,
evolved to such an extent."
Although the Supreme Court refused to hold that Bursey's consti-
tutional rights had been violated, it did not deny the existence of
all sixth amendment protections for the attorney-client privilege.
Had Weatherford conveyed the substance of the attorney-client
meeting, either by testifying at Bursey's trial regarding the confer-
ence or by turning over evidence of the same to members of the
prosecution, 23 then there would have been "at least a realistic possi-
bility" of undue prejudice 4 to Bursey's right to the effective assis-
tance of counsel or of undue benefit to the prosecution. By the
majority's standards, the test for a sixth amendment violation when
a government informer has been present at an attorney-client con-
ference is whether any of the government's evidence originated in
the reported conversations.2 1
Also rejected by the Supreme Court was the court of appeals'
finding of a violation of the fourteenth amendment due process right
to a fair trial. The majority said that the Brady prohibition against
concealing evidence favorable to an accused did not create a consti-
tutional right to discovery in criminal cases.26 Particularly, the pros-
ecution was not obliged to reveal the names of all the witnesses who
would testify against the accused. 7
22. A third case, Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293 (1966), also relied upon by the court
of appeals, was found inapposite by the Supreme Court. The Court said Hoffa did not hold
that a conviction would have to be set aside simply because an informer overheard a defen-
dant conversing with his attorneys. On the contrary, the Court thought that Hoffa merely
assumed, without deciding, that irrespective of the validity of such a proposition, it did not
bear upon Hoffa's case because the government informer had not testified regarding any
overheard conversations between attorney and client. He only answered questions pertinent
to conversations occuring between defendant Hoffa and third parties while Hoffa's attorneys
were not present. 429 U.S. at 553-54.
23. 429 U.S. at 554.
24. In his brief, Bursey argued that proof of prejudice was not required as a condition for
relief from sixth amendment violations. Brief for Respondent, supra note 1, at 26. Otherwise,
defendants may be given impossible burdens of proof, for offending officials are not likely to
confess their guilt. Furthermore, Bursey urged that courts should not speculate as to the
degree of prejudice resulting from the denial of a fundamental right, such as the right to
counsel. Id. at 27.
25. 429 U.S. at 554.
26. Id. at 559-60.
27. The Supreme Court similarly rejected the other conclusions of the court of appeals
that Bursey's constitutional right to a fair trial was affected. The Court said that the effect
of the prosecution's actions on Bursey's opportunity to plea bargain was not a constitutional
issue, for there is no constitutional right to plea bargain. Id. at 560-61. The court of appeals
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In a dissenting opinion, Justices Marshall and Brennan identified
two independent constitutional values jeopardized by surreptitious
governmental intrusions into confidential consultations between
attorney and client."8 The first of these was the fairness of a trial. If
this value was to be protected, said the dissenters, then the integrity
of the adversary system must be maintained. Under the due process
clause, discovery must be a two-way street, and the state cannot
seek information concerning the details of a defendant's case yet
preserve the secrecy of its own case.
Of equal importance was privacy of communication with coun-
sel- the essence, in the dissenters' view, of the sixth amendment
right to confer with one's attorney.29 To the extent that the sixth
had also suggested that Bursey was deprived of an opportunity to prepare for the cross-
examination of Weatherford, but the Court countered by noting that Bursey never objected
to Weatherford's testimony at trial, nor requested a continuance. Therefore, in the Court's
opinion, there was no showing that Bursey suffered substantial prejudice. As for the alleged
devastating effect of Weatherford's surprise testimony, the Supreme Court concluded that
the disadvantage to the defense was no greater than would result in any other case in which
unanticipated, damaging evidence is introduced. Id. at 561.
28. Id. at 560 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
29. Id. at 564. The sixth amendment right to privacy between counsel and client is dis-
tinct from the traditional rule of attorney-client privilege found in the common law. The
purpose of the attorney-client privilege, which has been part of Anglo-American common law
for centuries, is to prevent others from compelling an attorney to divulge confidential infor-
mation given to him by his client.
The common law privilege is frequently summarized as follows: "(1) Where legal advice of
any kind is sought (2) from a professional legal adviser in his capacity as such, (3) the
communications relating to that purpose, (4) made in confidence (5) by the client, (6) are at
his instance permanently protected (7) from disclosure by himself or by the legal adviser, (8)
except the protection be waived." 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2292 (McNaughton rev. ed.
1961). The right to privacy under the sixth amendment is distinct from the common law
privilege in two important respects. First, the attorney-client privilege is effective against
anyone, government employee or private citizen, not a party to the confidential exchange
between attorney and client. The right to privacy between attorney and client under the sixth
amendment only shields the attorney-client meetings from intrusion by government-planted
informants or listening devices, not from the actions of private citizens. See United States v.
LaVallee, 319 F.2d 37 (2d Cir. 1963). Second, the attorney-client privilege prevents others
from questioning the attorney about matters discussed with his client. The sixth amendment
protection, as the majority in Weatherford construed it, forbids government-planted inform-
ants or undercover agents from revealing what they overheard from an attorney-client ex-
change to law enforcement officials.
These two distinctions indicate that the sixth amendment rule is quite different from the
common law privilege. The attorney-client privilege is usually considered waived by the
presence of a third party, except if that party is the authorized representative/agent of either
the attorney or the client. See McCoRMICK's HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 91 (2d ed.
E. Cleary 1972). However, the presence of a co-defendant who is sharing the same attorney
does not negate the existence of the privilege. Id. The presence of a co-defendant who does
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amendment established a right to confidential communication with
counsel, that right was invaded by the mere presence of a govern-
ment agent. The dissenters concluded that even assuming a per se
invasion into the privacy of the attorney-client meeting would not
affect the fairness of the trial or the effectiveness of counsel, the
practice of spying on attorney-client conferences should not be toler-
ated. A prophylactic rule was essential to provide breathing space
for this precious constitutional right.1
The sixth amendment right to counsel has been held to guarantee
not only the right to retain counsel, but also the right to effective
assistance of counsel.' "Effective assistance" is a flexible term,
taking its meaning from the facts of the case at hand.32 In general,
before a court will adjudge defense counsel's assistance as falling
below constitutional minimums, his ineffectiveness must have been
such that justice was not served.33
not intend to employ the same attorney waives the attorney-client privilege. The privilege
remains, however, when a joint conference between several defendants and their attorneys is
conducted for the purpose of establishing a joint defense. See Continental Oil Co. v. United
States, 330 F.2d 347 (9th Cir. 1964) (court quashed subpeona duces tecum calling for produc-
tion before grand jury of memoranda prepared by attorneys concerning information received
from clients who were grand jury witnesses). Furthermore, an exchange of information
between attorneys for different defendants has been held not to waive the attorney-client
privilege where both defendants might be subject to indictment based on the same incident
and so may share common issues. See Hunydee v. United States, 355 F.2d 183 (9th Cir. 1965)
(husband and wife employed separate counsel for defense of charges of income tax evasion).
As the dissenters in Weatherford interpreted the sixth amendment right to counsel, the
guarantee of private consultation with counsel would not be waived by the presence of an
undercover agent even though the defendant was aware of the presence of a third party. If
that third party turned out to be a government agent, the sixth amendment protection would
still stand, since the purpose of the sixth amendment right is to prevent the intrusion by the
government agents ab initio. Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U.S. at 563-64 (Marshall, J., dissent-
ing).
30. 429 U.S. at 565.
31. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932) (appointment of "all the members of the bar"
not an effective appointment of counsel).
32. See Stone, Ineffective Assistance of Counsel and Post-Conviction Relief in Criminal
Cases: Changing Standards and Practical Consequences, 7 COLUM. HUMAN RIGHTS L. Rav. 427
(1975) [hereinafter cited as Stone].
33. Examples of the different standards used by the courts to measure effectiveness can
be found in the following cases: Jenkins v. United States, 530 F.2d 1203 (5th Cir. 1976)
("reasonably effective"); United States v. Hines, 470 F.2d 225 (3rd Cir. 1972) ("customary
skill"), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 968 (1973); United States v. Miramon, 470 F.2d 1362 (9th Cir.
1972) (counsel's ineffectiveness made trial a "farce or mockery of justice"), cert. denied, 411
U.S. 934 (1973); United States v. Currier, 405 F.2d 1039 (2d Cir.) (ineffectiveness such as
would "shock the conscience"), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 914 (1969); Williams v. Beto, 354 F.2d
698 (5th Cir. 1965) (attorney so ineffective that trial was "a sham").
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The denial of an opportunity for private discussions between an
accused and his counsel has been held to be a denial of effective
assistance of counsel. In Coplon v. United States,34 where the defen-
dant's telephone conversations with her attorney were allegedly
tapped by the government, the Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia, citing numerous state decisions,3 5 decided that such an
intrusion would interfere with the defendant's right to effective as-
sistance of counsel and, if proven, would entitle her to a new trial.
The Coplon court did not require the defendant to demonstrate that
she was prejudiced as a result of the sixth amendment violation,
relying on Glasser v. United States, 31 where the Supreme Court held
that the right to counsel is so fundamental that courts should not
attempt to calculate the prejudice resulting from the denial.
The Coplon rationale was followed in Caldwell v. United States, 37
another decision of the Court of Appeals for the District of Colum-
bia, where the prosecution had hired a person to spy on the defen-
dant and his attorney on a matter unrelated to the defendant's
upcoming trial. Not finding any distinction between an intrusion by
wiretapping or by government agent,3 the court reversed the convic-
tion on sixth amendment grounds without requiring a demonstra-
Generally, faulty "trial tactics" are not considered to be a basis for post-conviction relief,
and courts usually require a showing of prejudice before reversing any conviction on this
ground. See Stone, supra note 32, at 435-36. Likewise, allegations of insufficient time for trial
preparation generally must be supported by proof of prejudice, especially where counsel is
an experienced attorney. Id. at 441.
34. 191 F.2d 749 (D.C. Cir. 1951). The right to counsel issue arose because the government
had tapped the defendant's phone conversations with her attorney prior to,. during, and
subsequent to her trial. The court, upon reversing the conviction, wrote: "It is well established
that an accused does not enjoy the effective aid of counsel if he is denied the right of private
consultation with him." Id. at 757. Although wiretapping was not a criminal offense, the court
said that the fifth and sixth amendments nevertheless "unqualifiedly guard the right to
assistance of counsel, without making the indication of the right depend.upon whether its
denial resulted in demonstrable prejudice." Id. at 759.
35. Among those cases cited by the court were Ex parte Qualls, 58 Cal. App. 2d 330, 331,
136 P.2d 341, 343 (1943) ("The right [of defendants] to private consultations with their
counsel is a corollary of the constitutional right to be represented by counsel in their de-
fense."); Hughes v. Cashin, 184 Misc. 757, 761, 54 N.Y.S.2d 437, 440-41 (Sup. Ct. 1945) ("It
is . . . true that the right to a private interview by a person accused of crime with his lawyer
prior to trial is a valuable right, and it is the duty of the court to jealously guard the accused
from deprivation thereof.").
36. 315 U.S. 60 (1942) (attorney chosen by defendant was appointed by the trial court to
also represent the accused's co-defendant).
37. 205 F.2d 879 (D.C. Cir. 1953).
38. Id. at 881.
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tion of prejudice to the defendant from the intrusion. 9 Weatherford
can be factually distinguished; Coplon involved surreptitious wire-
taps, clearly fourth amendment violations, and Caldwell involved
a government agent's relating the content of the attorney-client
meeting to the prosecution. Nevertheless, the rationale behind
Coplon and Caldwell would require a result in Weatherford opposite
that reached by the Supreme Court.
Admittedly, Coplon and Caldwell are decisions by the court of
appeals, but they were cited with apparent approval in subsequent
Supreme Court cases.4" Furthermore, two Supreme Court decisions,
Black4 and O'Brien," could be viewed as supporting a per se right-
to-counsel rule. A major dispute between the majority and the dis-
senters in Weatherford centered around their conflicting interpreta-
tions of Black and O'Brien. Since neither case expressly delineated
the constitutional grounds for the reversal of the convictions, it was
possible for the majority to read Black and O'Brien as focusing on
a fourth amendment violation,43 while the dissenters contended that
the cases decided a sixth amendment issue." Depending upon which
fact is thought to be determinative, the illegal wiretaps or the intru-
sion into attorney-client discussions, either view might be accepted.
In subsequent cases, however, the Supreme Court read and relied
upon Black and O'Brien as sixth amendment cases.
In Hoffa v. United States,45 an appeal from a mail fraud convic-
39. The court found the prosecution's invasion of the confidential attorney-client consul-
tations to be determinative. The case of On Lee v. United States, 343 U.S. 747 (1952), was
distinguished in a footnote. In On Lee, a government agent had a hidden microphone on his
person when he spoke with the defendant. The Supreme Court held that this procedure did
not constitute an unreasonable search and seizure. To distinguish On Lee, the Caldwell court
noted that the surreptitious effort before it was not an attempt to gather information directed
at the accused alone, nor was it a case in which evidence had simply been improperly
admitted-both fourth amendment violations. Instead, the Caldwell court viewed the issue
as a sixth amendment problem: "Here the effort involved intrusion upon conferences, suppos-
edly open only to the most loyal, between accused and his counsel." 205 F.2d at 881 n.10
(emphasis by the court).
40. See Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 576 (1974) (civil rights action challenging
administrative procedures of prison); Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 307 (1966) (prose-
cution's use of paid informant to engage defendant in incriminating conversations held not
to violate sixth amendment since statements were not made in presence of counsel). See also
notes 49 & 53 and accompanying text infra.
41. 385 U.S. 26 (1966). For factual and procedural history, see note 12 supra.
42. 386 U.S. 345 (1967). For factual and procedural history, see note 13 supra.
43. 429 U.S. at 552.
44. Id. at 567 n.6.
45. 387 U.S. 231 (1967) (petitioners convicted for mail and wire fraud).
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tion, a communication between the defendant and a third party was
overheard by the Federal Bureau of Investigation via electronic
eavesdropping installed by trespass. The Supreme Court held that
since there was no direct intrusion into an attorney-client relation-
ship, as in Black and O'Brien, it would not, as it had in Black and
O'Brien, require a new trial. Instead, the court vacated and re-
manded for proceedings to determine if the intercepted conversa-
tions vitiated the conviction in some manner. 6 The different remedy
given in Hoffa strongly suggests that the Court in Black and O'Brien
was not attempting to cure a fourth amendment violation but was
directing its attention to the sixth amendment issue. Had the fourth
amendment violation been the Court's concern, a remand would
have been appropriate to determine whether in fact the illegal evi-
dence was used in obtaining a conviction. Only a sixth amendment
intrusion, affecting the fundamental fairness of the conviction,
would have necessitated a new trial.
In an appeal of an unrelated jury tampering conviction, Hoffa v.
United States,47 the Court held that no sixth amendment right had
been violated under the facts presented, even assuming Coplon and
Caldwell were rightly decided, and generally referred to Black as
authority for resolving the sixth amendment issue.
More recently, in Wolff v. McDonnell," a civil rights action chal-
lenging a prison's administrative proceedings as violative of an in-
mate's sixth amendment rights, the Court cited Black, O'Brien, and
Coplon to establish that the sixth amendment only protects the
attorney-client relationship from intrusion in the "criminal set-
ting."49
Therefore, at least three decisions of the Supreme Court prior to
Weatherford have relied on Black and O'Brien as sixth amendment
cases. If Black and O'Brien are sixth amendment cases, then the
46. Id. at 233-34.
47. 385 U.S. 293, 307 (1966). See notes 51-53 and accompanying text infra.
48. 418 U.S. 539 (1974). Among other claims, the plaintiff alleged that his sixth amend-
ment right to counsel had been violated by the prison's policy of opening all mail, including
mail from the plaintiff's attorney, and inspecting it for contraband. Before the case reached
the Supreme Court, the prison's policy had been modified so that any mail sent by an
attorney was to be marked "privileged" and could not be opened except in the presence of
the inmate to whom it was addressed. When the case reached the Supreme Court, the
question was whether the prison's policy, as modified, violated the first, sixth, and fourteenth
amendments. The Court held that none of these amendments were violated by the new
procedure. Id. at 576.
49. Id.
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rationale of those decisions would support a finding of a sixth
amendment violation anytime an accused's confidential discussions
with his attorney are invaded. Furthermore, the fact that in Black
and O'Brien the intrusion was by electronic surveillance, rather
than an informant, would not justify overlooking the sixth amend-
ment violation in Weatherford. It is not the mode of the invasion
that offends sixth amendment guarantees, but the presence of a
governmental "ear" during private meetings preparatory to a crimi-
nal trial.50 The significance to Weatherford of the Hoffa decision in
the jury tampering case does not lie solely in its interpretation of
Black. In Hoffa, the defendant was initially tried on charges of
violating the Taft-Hartley Act5' but was never convicted because his
trial ended with a hung jury. Subsequently, the defendant was tried
and convicted for attempting to bribe jurors at the former trial. The
defendant appealed, maintaining that his sixth amendment rights
had been violated by the presence of a government informer at
conferences between the defendant and his attorney during the for-
mer trial.
The Hoffa Court assumed the informant was present during the
attorney-client meeting preparatory to the defendant's trial for vio-
lation of the Taft-Hartley Act. Since that trial did not result in a
conviction, it was not necessary for the Court to determine if the
defendant's right to counsel had been violated for that trial. The
defendant's bribery conviction presented an entirely separate mat-
ter, and, in the Court's view, the crucial question was whether the
government informant was present at attorney-client conferences
pertaining to the defense of the bribery charge.2 Since the evidence
supported a finding that the informant and defendant had only
discussed the bribery plan when the defendant's counsel was not
present, the court held the defendant's right to counsel for the brib-
50. See Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U.S. at 564, 566-67 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
51. The official title of this Act is the Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § §141-
197 (1970).
52. The Court's language was clear on this point.
[The] clinching basic fact in the present case [is] that none of the petitioner's
incriminating statements which Partin [the informer] heard were made in the pres-
ence of counsel, in the hearing of counsel, or in connection in any way with the legiti-
mate defense of the Test Fleet prosecution [Taft-Hartley violations]. The petitioner's
statements related to the commission of a quite separate offense-attempted bribery
of jurors-and the statements were made to Partin out of the presence of any lawyers.
385 U.S. at 308.
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ery trial was not violated. The Hoffa Court looked upon the sixth
amendment right to counsel as a right arising each time an accused
is brought to trial; thus, alleged violations of this right must be
examined in the context of the trial on that particular charge. 3
In Weatherford, the government agent was indisputably present
during the attorney-client conference pertaining to the conviction
and appeal then before the Court. While it is true the district court
found that the agent never communicated the substance of the
meeting to his superiors, communication was not the "clinching
basic fact" referred to in the Hoffa case." The Hoffa decision turned
on the fact that the informant was not present during the attorney-
client conference for the conviction before the Court on appeal. By
contrast, the government agent in Weatherford knowingly attended
an attorney-client consultation; under these facts, Hoffa would ap-
pear to support a finding of a sixth amendment violation.
Either the Weatherford majority is wrong in its interpretation of
case law or, at best, case law is ambiguous. Black, O'Brien, and
Hoffa appear to support Bursey's cause of action, but it is possible,
as the majority did, to distinguish Weatherford factually from Black
and O'Brien and to read Hoffa as not resolving the scope of the sixth
amendment protection. In the face of this ambiguity, however, the
Court should have resolved the sixth amendment issue in favor of
Bursey on policy grounds. By tolerating intrusions into confidential
attorney-client meetings, the Supreme Court is actually encourag-
ing future invasions. The right to counsel is a fundamental right
under the United States Constitution," and the decision in
Weatherford emasculates the protection afforded this right by the
sixth amendment. The majority would condition a finding of a sixth
amendment violation upon proof that the informant related the
evidence to other law enforcement officials," or that the informant
went into the meeting with the intent of violating an accused's sixth
amendment rights.57 This is an unsatisfactory remedy because it
places an almost impossible burden of proof on the defendant; of-
fending government informants are not likely to admit their guilt.
53. Id. at 307-08.
54. See note 52 supra.
55. In Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967), the Court noted that the right to counsel
is so fundamental to a fair trial that an infraction of this right cannot be considered harmless
error. Id. at 23 n.8 (citing Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963)).
56. 429 U.S. at 556.
57. Id. at 558.
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The courts should vigorously defend the right to counsel and all
fundamental rights guaranteed by the Constitution. It would be
understandable for the courts to allow a concession to the per se rule
when it is shown that an informant would have placed himself in
grave danger by refusing to attend the attorney-client meeting.
Aside from this limited exception, intrusion upon an accused's sixth
amendment right to counsel should not be tolerated.
Nancy E. Pirt
